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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN LYNN KAYf dba GARY APARTMENTS 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. -'•-• ' : 
JOSEPH BRENT WOOD 
Respondent and Defendant, Case No. 14197 
v, 
STEVEN LYNN KAY, et al, and 
GARY APARTMENT CORPORATION, . 
Third-Party Defendants and 
Appellants 
BREIF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a Judgment by the lower court 
in favor of the respondent (purchaser) and against the 
appellants (sellers) with regard to a liquidated damages 
provision under a Uniform Real Estate Contract. The court 
would not allow a total forfeiture as it would be 
considered unconscionable. 
PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
The case was tried without a jury on June 28 and July 
13, 1973/ (R.26) (not on January 17, 1975, as appellant asser 
in his brief, page 1). The court entered a Memorandum 
Decision on October 3, 1973, (R.26) ruling that respondent 
had defaulted in failing to pay the balance due under 
the contract; dismissed respondent's counterclaim for decision 
for fraudulant misrepresentation; and further found that 
"to enforce the forfeiture provisions of the contract would 
be unconscionable and the amount of such forfeiture would 
far exceed any loss to plaintiff that the parties may 
have contemplated." (R.27) The court stated that the 
plaintiff would be entitled to a judgment in the amount of 
$26,648.30 and ordered the case reopened for the purpose of 
taking additional testimony as to what, if any, offsets 
plaintiff was entitled to as actual damages. (R.27) 
On December 5, 1974, using the Perkins v. Spencer, 121 
Utah 468,242 P2d 445 formula, the court held a hearing to 
determine what offsets, if any, plaintiff was entitled to 
for: Loss of bargain; Reasonable rental value, 14 months; 
Commission, if any, on sale; Damage or depreciation to 
property; and Decline in value, if any, of property. (R.27) 
Pursuant to that hearing, on January 17, 1975, the court 
entered new findings (R 13-17, 49-50). The court set forth 
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the payments made by respondent and the offsets the court 
felt by law were allowable to appellant. The court then 
concluded that to enforce the forfeiture provisions of the 
contract would not be unconscionable (R.16). Respondent 
concluded that the court's latest findings did not consider 
all of the amounts paid by respondent and moved the court 
for a new trial and for new Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. The court took the motion under advisement and on 
June 26, 1975, signed Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law which is the subject of appeal (R.19-23). 
The court returned to its original decision that "To enforce 
the forfeiture provisions of the contract would be 
unconscionable..." (R.32). The court entered judgment for 
respondent against appellants in the sum of $4,663.05 (R.34). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
 : -
Respondent seeks to have this court sustain the lower 
court's finding that the forfeiture provisions of the 
contract should not be enforced. Respondent further seeks 
on its cross-appeal that it be found that the court erred 
as a matter of law and equity in not granting a judgment 
to respondent for all moneys paid to appellant in cash or 
by improvements to the property above actual damages. 
• ' • " • • • • - • • ; • - , v - , . ^ - 3 - . 
STATEMENT OP FACTS 
On or about July 10, 1971, appellant and respondent 
entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract for the purchase 
of two eight-plex apartments used for student rentals at 
Snow College located at Ephriam, Utah. (The Contract at 
R.109-112 is the final contract actually signed). Respondent 
was to purchase appellant's equity in the property by 
paying twelve thousand dollars in two equal payments of six 
thousand dollars each. The property also had a mortgage 
balance which respondent was to retire. The respondent 
alleged that he purchased the property on appellant's 
representation that the cash flow from the rentals would 
carry the expenses of operation, including servicing the 
debt to Zion's Bank. Appellant, Kay, admitted the 
representations but claimed they were expressly restricted 
to the "school year." (The real estate listing represented 
gross income double the amount actually grossed by 
appellant (sellers).) (Pltf's Exhibit No. 2). 
Respondent paid the appellant, Kay, $6,000.00 of the 
$12,000.00 equity in July of 1971 when possession was 
delivered to respondent. Pursuant to the contract terms 
(Paragraph (f) at R.112) respondent immediately commenced 
to upgrade the buildings and by September of 1971 made 
$5,802.30 dollars worth of permanent improvements to the 
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bui ld ing , including carpe t ing , pa in t ing , e t c . Respondent 
'^•urdt-ed Hv> apartments u n t i l August 19 72,. In June of Vi 12 
respondent n o t i t i e d appel lant , Kay, Ity l e t t e r , that the property 
had not car r ied i t s e l f as v "--aresented and that thti ?d , ni.Kl , DO 
balance 4<mLtl not- In- paid unless If wa; reduced or extended 
over a period of six years . Respondent ami appellant could 
r r o e *~ \ reduced pr ice <* :n -jxtonsi'j:. -i M:ne i^r 
L ivment, v .• ~._ j *r>-' l a ~ v u , : "v.if :;me 
respondent *:ad o a i t appel lan. ?-
 t I . . < . :* \ i . 30 
-or ,T.v:o.^ro . - ;
 0 v , ; a > t t :4h. \ . the 
i" ctgage ( c u h rcdic-i-A ;:•. ( • . ;:. * J . ja"*. *; , ' e f t ' s 
~, xi y. "he j r coe i t " -c* i l l1 fai .ec . :• ' :;.":*v , ~ •_:£" 
I,- r ^ i . e r ? rep Leo- ••" ^ * - * a-* - ' ,•-* ml : v~ 
o p e n t i v , " t e n s e s , resoonaert DG. i *>- . :.„ t'ha 
cash rece ip t s received by him, the sum of $7,551.00 IDeft's 
Exh Mo. 1.4) . ' ' • 
0*i * . aist 23, ippoilant- ^Ll-"1 ~i Tirr>l^ir+- i. 
in an :.c , - *.-. t* c; °" ~' a. * -* ..v; _i 1 ^rmo" :.-, 
and impr;/: -r-enrs i>~ .. ^ gu.u n. e L^ . i , - - - :r a : JLO^. 
The court ' imediat^iy tssut •! .: ox oar ty " i ar -n; ;i * na 
responded : v .\ - : -.3:- - - , * - r c L ^ r * w ^nd r-j-iri:i«} 
responded - \a: _>aL .*<- r ^v^ .^sK.r : • . ». * - . 
kesponu* - ~ - v> '1 * h'^  v: .i^r that ?ft"^ir.:'-p. , n ic-.r :].:[• 
Utah,and respondent delLvered possession of the property 
per the court_o_rder by giving the master key to appe l l an t ' s 
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attorney at about 5:00 p.m. 
The matter was tried with the results fully described 
under the heading DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT, page 2 of 
this brief. 
" " ARGUMENT J 
POINT I ^ : 
THE COURT'S DECISION THAT TO ENFORCE THE FORFEITURE 
PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACT WOULD BE UNCONSCIONABLE IS 
SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS OF THE CASE. 
The law, as to the enforcability of forfeiture clauses 
in Uniform Real Estate Contracts and other contracts, is 
well developed in the Utah Case Law. The Utah Supreme 
Court has been a leader in protecting the rights of a 
defaulting but otherwise blameless purchaser. Utah's early 
case of Malmberg v. Baugh 62 Utah 331, 218 P. 975 (1923) 
has been praised as one of the best on this subject, and 
has been favorably cited by many courts and writers. (See 
"Forfeitures Under Real Estate Installment Contracts in 
Utah," by Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, 3 Utah Law Review 30.) : 
In the case of Freedmon v. Rector of St. Mathias Parish 
230 P. 2d 629 (Cal. 1951) Justice Traynor of the California 
Supreme Court cited Malmberg v. Baugh as he concluded that 
the forfeiture clause "cannot be enforced as a valid clause 
providing for liquidated damages." Judge Traynor, in the 
same opinion, went on to state: 
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Such .•.:naitiias ; ;n.uk: reasonably be jusLirievi 
as punishment for one who willfully breaches 
his contract...If a penalty were t^ be imposed, 
it should bear some rational relationship to 
its purpose, A penalty equal to the net benefits 
conferred by part performance bears no sue: 
relationship. It not only fails to take :n~ . 
consideration the degree of culpability, but, 
its severity increases as the seriousness of 
the breach decreases. Thus, a vendee who 
breaches his contract before he has benef i~ N* i 
the vendor by part performance suffers no 
penalty, whereas one who has almoLt completely 
performed his contract suffers the maximum 
penaip-v. Freedman v. Rector of St. Mathias 
Parish", :V? ~. 2* ^?Q fCal. 1951)""" 
Most V:\\>rican ,:ourf.s >••/. . . :.-: \ '.•*. . .• ; y enforce a 
liquidale-i d..images clause where there is no actual danuujej. 
Courts are, and should be, i -luetant to enforce a forfeiture 
cliune aqalnst a patty who has good cause, l:nt perhaps not 
i leqai oxruso, Ini* nonperformance. In the instant, case, 
had the property aenerato-d 4 ru .'ash h'<?eipts represented 
by l he selle c; ; "V: -i-<: -itate agent
 r presumauLy there . 
would have been n > ,i . i. breach due to financial 
hardship or error i 'udamena \ s not 'jonsidored wilful 
and dtilibera . , "-.->•-»• •>-••? -lathinq wiLful, wanton
 r or 
malicious in :he :'j:^i\ic^ : -.:• i*esp> indent' s inability . 
'"« make Hie r IVIUPP':? re:":u- red. Respondent afieied 1. pay 
the balance due it given an extension ot time. The stop;. >^ 
of payments due to economic hardnhii, . mis fortune, et- , 
is not a > >/i lf/ui default, (See Restatement of Contracts; 
12 Willis ton/ Contracts Se , •, 14 7 (\ ( 1 • 17 o) , 5 
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Corbin, Contracts Sec. 1123 (1964) and FreediMh v. Rector 
supra) . . • • v ? " 
Courts have and should employ nonenforcement of a 
forfeiture clause as an equitable compromise and a 
corrective device in situations like the instant case. 
Awarding liquidated damages that a court believes to be 
in excess of actual damages violates the compensation 
principle. In many cases, including the one at bar, 
forfeiture would be punitive in nature and would violate 
the compensation principle. This principle seeks to give . 
the plaintiff what the defendant's breach has cost him and 
not put the plaintiff in a better position than he would 
have been in had there been proper performance. 
The compensation principle was reiterated in Young 
v. Hansen 218 P. 2d 666 (1950) when Judge Wolfe stated: 
Where a written contract for the sale of real 
estate contains a provision for forfeiture or 
a provision that installment may be retained 
by the seller as liquidated damages, the courts '* 
determine whether the amounts received by the 
seller are greatly in excess of the fair 
rental value and any extra ordinary wear and 
tear and if so, treat it as a penalty and 
require remission. This is a device to do 
equity. [Emphasis added] 
This compensation rule has been stated most succinctly 
and clearly in the case of Perkins v. Spencer supra'. 
-8-
. ..Wh^r:.: *-.h^  f.artJ^s to a -ontracr st. Luplate ~he 
amount of liquidated damages f--..it * .11". I ' <e paid in 
case of \ breach, such stipulation is, as a general 
rule, enforceable, if the amount stipulated is not 
disproportionate to the damages actually sustained. 
[Emphasis added] 
i j_ciw, then, requires the con : * ~: ?o^pare the 
stipulated amount ui "r^ ie 11 qui l.it *d damages •-: * h -.he actual 
damages sustained and caused by the breach . -. -
seller s ^ip^n? itod but not unjustly 'Muiched. 
*
n
 Jensen v. Neilson, ^o Jtih M »n1( l'J."» I , 2d 67J 
(I97L) I'it-od by appellant, t"he court did not reverse i+-s 
. "^
v
 cos- * ion i » d-atod 1 h flalmbei\i " , Baugh; Young v, 
II m_sen; Perkins v. Spencer; etc. "The 0o u1:t re 1.1eraie<I its 
r;?q:;... :.v ::>'--• - 01" .in accounting. It. found against the 
:^ ir chaser ror factual reasons totally different from the 
i - *- mr. ? :d^ i:/i -~ 1 3r „u~- ^eirvr *--:-t ^  * n-'i by sellers was 
less triai 
Ir tV. ^:^ra;.- -<-:- . thr Q4_andard r ^-:j - % , 
C .s* • , • L T 1 "**' 1 ' ^ i: -h > .:. :';; i:..2i. i images 0 "i Id n j L.-J _. 
"ail payments ,*,-_ - - :-, - ,.->- • : • -re on *h " 
con-ri :t " - r ' •. . .* >ce'_her ..:L, . ..[p.provemi. 
and . ii.
 :- cue ua- - d.on- n. (I*..1LC< :*:ere 
was no testimony, and the record ttjlibct1. im 11 1 ognti > JU 1 
H u t the parties ever discussed damages that might result 
to either party aiouid tnurn tr ,1 default in the contract. 
.9. 
No effort was made by the parties to estimate the actual 
damages that might have been suffered by the appellant in 
the event of respondent's breach. On the state of the 
record, the trial judge quite reasonably concluded that ; r 
the stipulated damage was arbitrarily arrived at by the 
preprinted contract and was not intended to represent damages. 
It is undisputed by the appellant that he received 
$6,-000.00 cash when the contract was executed, that the sum 
of $5,802.30 was expended for permanent improvements on the 
building (per Paragraph (F) R.112), and that thirteen monthly 
mortgage payments, totaling $14,846.00 were paid, causing 
a net principal reduction of $4,663.05 (Appl. Brief p. 2). 
Appellants,received a direct total cash benefit from respondeni 
performance in the minimum amount of $16,465.35. In determinii 
then, whether to enforce the forfeiture provisions of the 
contract, the court must and did compare the damages 
actually sustained by appellants with the stipulated amount. 
The uncontroverted facts of this case are that the appellants 
sustained no actual damages. While the court, in this 
case, reopened the trial for the specific purpose of 
allowing the appellant to put on any testimony of actual 
damage not covered at the trial, no evidence of damage 
was ever presented. A search of the record on appeal will 
not show any claim to any allowable damages. A search of 
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appellant's brief will find no actual damages claimed. 
The lower court properly concluded that the stipulated 
damages were sufficiently disproportionate to the damages 
actually sustained to allow a total forfeiture of amounts 
paid. 
While it is true that the courts may not want to 
interfere with the ability of people to freely contract 
one with another, the court is obligated to guard against 
unjust enrichment and unconscionable forfeitures. In the 
instant case, the court did not automatically disturb the 
contract between the parties. The respondent specifically 
plead the theory of unjust enrichment as follows: "To allow 
a forfeiture would be to unjustly enrich the plaintiff and 
to provide damages in excess of the actual damages and 
thereby punish the defendant contrary to law." (R.87) 
On the trial of this matter, the plaintiff put on no 
evidence of any actual damages sustained as a result of 
the breach. Months later the court reopened the case 
for the specific purpose of allowing the plaintiff to 
show any offsets or damages that it might have sustained 
by reason of defendant1s breach. No evidence of any 
damages were presented. 
Respondent, by way of interrogatories, attempted to 
ascertain any damages which appellant suffered as a result 
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of respondent's breach. (R.96-98) The appellant objected 
to most of the interrogatories, stating that they were not 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
law suit. (R.95) Both respondent and the court have given 
the appellant ample and every opportunity to come forth 
with any showing of an actual monetary damage occurring 
to appellant as a result of respondent's breach. No 
damages have ever been shown. To automatically enforce 
the forfeiture provisions in the instant case would allow 
damages grossly in excess of any damages realized and could 
only result in a total unjust enrichment for appellant. 
Appellant seems to take solace from the fact that 
the respondent is an attorney at law and therefore 
understood the forfeiture clause contained in the contract. 
No such solace may be found, however, since the profession 
of the purchaser is irrelevant. An attorney is as 
entitled to equity as any ordinary purchaser. As this 
court recently stated in Williamson v. Wanless, Utah 
2d , P2d , (1976 Supreme Court No. 14076) : 
"The principles of equity and justice are universal; they 
apply wherever appropriate and necessary to enforce rights 
or to prevent oppression and injustices." (See also cases 
cited therein.) 
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> Justice Worthen did not exempt attorney purchasers 
when he stated the following in Cole v. Parker 300 P. 2d 
623,627: 
I am in general agreement with the doctrine 
that equity should give protection to a 
defaulting purchaser whose default is neither 
wilful nor deliberate against a grasping vendor 
who is waiting to spring the moment the 
vendee defaults in the slightest manner, and 
who seeks not the purchase money due him 
but the property sold plus enormous amounts 
in addition.
 ;, ,.•.. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND EQUITY IN ALLOWING 
APPELLANTS IMPROPER CREDITS AS AN OFFSET TO THE MONEYS 
PAID TO APPELLANT BY RESPONDENT, - , 
The court, by its memorandum decision, dated October 
3, 1973, found that it would be unconscionable to enforce 
the forfeiture provision of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract between the partieshereto, as "the amount of 
such forfeiture would far exceed any loss to the plaintiff 
that the parties may have contemplated." (R.27) The 
court further found that the defendant would be entitled 
to an accounting with plaintiff and a judgment against 
appellant for the difference between the amounts respondent 
paid on the contract plus improvements less any offsets 
that the plaintiff might be entitled to. (R.27) The court 
-13-
further found that the respondent had paid sums of money 
that benefited appellant as follows (R.27): 
Down payment $ 6,000.00 
Thirteen monthly mortgage 
payments 14,846.00 
Permanent improvements 5, 802.30 
TOTAL $26,648.30 
The court further in its memorandum decision followed 
the Perkins v. Spencer (supra) doctrine and formula and 
ordered the matter reopened for taking of additional 
testimony as to what, if any, offset plaintiff was entitled 
to according to a formula used by the court: 
Loss of bargain $ 
Reasonable rental value, 
fourteen months $ 
Commission, if any, on sale . . . $ 
Damage or depreciation to 
property $ 
Decline in value, if any, 
of property $ 
TOTAL $ 
The lower court easily disposed of several of the credit; 
due the seller. First, it was stipulated at the rehearing 
that the plaintiff had not paid any commission on the sale 
of the property to respondent, thus excluding that item as 
a possible credit or damage to the appellant. Appellant 
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objected to any written interrogatories or questions at 
trial as to the resale of the property after the appellant's 
retaking thereof. The court sustained those objections 
so there is no evidence of resale of the property or of 
any commission being paid on the resale of the property. 
No offset was allowed for decline in market value. 
The only evidence as to the fair market value of the 
property, at the time of retaking, was the testimony of 
an expert real estate appraiser. The appraiser made an 
appraisal of the property within a week of the retaking 
for Zions First National Bank. The appraised value of 
the property was $132,000.00, or $7,000.00 more than the 
contract price between the parties. The court made a 
specific finding that the property had, in fact, increased 
in value during the year of respondent's occupancy some 
$7,000.00 (R.21, Para. 9,14) Under these facts, the 
appellant would be entitled to no offset or credit for 
decline in market value. 
No offset should be allowed in the instant case for 
damage or depreciation to the property. No damage to the 
property was alleged or claimed by appellant. Depreciation 
to the property was claimed by appellant, but the claim was 
based on book or tax schedule depreciation and not actual 
-15-
depreciation. Only actual depreciation is a proper offset. 
The Utah Supreme Court has explained what is meant by damage 
to or depreciation of property in Perkins v. Spencer. 
This court stated that any damage to or depreciation of the 
property sustained during the buyer's period of occupancy 
will be reflected in a decline of the market values of the 
property. Only actual depreciation is reflected in market 
value. In the present case, since there was no decline 
in the market value of the property, there could not have 
been any damage to or depreciation of the property. Again 
the lower court found that the property had increased in 
value some $7,000.00 plus dollars. 
The court then considered evidence as to an offset 
for the reasonable rental value for the fourteen months 
of respondent's occupancy. The court, in its findings of 
fact, found that "the actual income received by the defendant 
[respondent] while operating the apartments was the reasonable 
rental value of the apartments and the actual expenses incurre 
by the defendant [respondent] while he was operating the 
property were reasonable expenses." (R.21, Para. 13) The 
evidence for that period showed that the gross income from 
rent receipts was $13,860.00 and that the total expenses 
prior to debt service were $6,293.80, making a net income 
before debt services of $7,294.96. Thus, in order for 
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respondent to operate the apartments and pay all expenses 
and service the debt, respondent was required to subsidize 
the apartments $7,551.04. (Def's Exhibit No. 14) It is 
clear from the foregoing that the maximum credit, if any, 
due to the appellant for the reasonable rental value for 
the period of occupancy would be the net income before 
debt service in the sum of $7,294.96. 
If the net rental income (reasonable rental value) 
is allowed as an offset, it should be applied to the thirteen 
monthly mortgage payments of $14,846.00. The same mortgage 
payments would have been made by appellants had they been 
in possession and the net income before debt service would 
have been only $7,294.96. Appellants' tax returns clearly 
show that, contrary to the real estate listing, they had 
substantially subsidized the apartments. (See Def's 
Exhibits 12 and 13). The lower court credited the 
respondent with the net principal mortgage reduction in 
the amount of $4,663.05. Thirteen monthly mortgage 
payments of $14,846.00 less the reasonable net rental 
value of $7,294.96 leaves respondent a balance of $7,551.04 
rather than $4,663.05 as found by the court. 
The last offset which the plaintiff would be entitled 
to under the court's formula was "loss of bargain." From 
-17-
the cases and decisions of the Utah Supreme Court, it is 
clear that there could be no damages suffered by the 
plaintiff as a loss of bargain. The Utah Supreme Court 
in several cases has held that: 
The measure of damages is the difference between 
the value of the land at the time of the breach 
of the contract, or, as it is sometimes stated, 
at the time of the the re-entering of the vendor and 
the abandonment of the land by the vendee, and 
the contract price agreed to be paid, together 
with interest on the purchase price...Dopp v, Richard, 
43 Utah 332,135 P. 98. 
(See also Malmberg v. Baugh, 218 P. 975, 980; Anderson v. 
Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 370, 335 P. 2d 404 (1959); CJS vol. 92 
"Vendor and Purchaser," sec, 537, P. 528, which also cites 
Perkins v. Spencer.) 
For the appellant to have suffered any damage by way 
of loss of bargain, the appellant would have to show that: 
(1) the contract price was for more than the market value 
of the property, or (2) that after retaking and on resale, 
appellant received less than the original contract price, 
i.e. $125,000.00. The lower court assumed that the fair 
market value at the time of contract was approximately 
$125,000.00, and specifically found that the market value 
of the property at the time of retaking was $132,000.00. 
(R.21 Para. 9) The court further found that the increased 
value resulted principally from the permanent improvements 
made by the defendant. (R.22 Para. 14) 
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The respondent attempted by interrogatory and by 
cross examination to determine if the appellant had any 
loss of bargain by reason of a loss suffered on resale 
of the property after retaking same. (R. 96 Para. 4,19) 
The appellant objected to the interrogatory and refused 
to answer the same. (R.95) The appellant likewise objected 
to the question at trial and the court sustained the 
objection. It is apparent from the appellant's objections 
that the property apparently had been resold at a price 
equal to or greater than the contract price of $125,000.00.. 
Thus the appellant suffered no loss of bargain. 
Both the appellants and the lower court have misinterpreted 
or wrongfully applied the concept of "loss of bargain." 
The appellants argue that the loss of bargain is the difference 
between appellants purchase price and the contract sales 
price. In answer to respondent1s interrogatories 
appellants stated the following (R.99): 
1. Do you claim damages due to loss of bargain? 
Answer: Yes 
2. If so, please state: (a) The amount 
of damage you claim is due to loss of bargain; 
Answer: $5,000.00 
(b) Set forth in detail how you computed or 
calculated the amount. 
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Answer: The sale of the apartments to Wood 
was for $125,000.00. Plaintiff had purchased : 
the apartments for $120,000.00. If Wood had 
continued to pay on the contract as he agreed 
to, I would have received $5,000.00. [Emphasis 
added] 
Appellant's purchase price is totally immaterial in 
determining loss of the bargain. What if appellants 
had paid $100,000.00, $75,000.00, or $50,000.00 for the 
property? Or what if it had been obtained free by 
inheritance? The court is too sufficiently versed on the 
meaning of benefit of the bargain for a further r€*cital 
here of the law. It has been clear since Malmberg v. Baugh 
and Young v. Hansen. 
The lower court construed benefit of the bargain to 
mean a contracted or negotiated benefit that flows naturally 
from the agreement. The court's memorandum decision states: 
2. The Court finds that the expenditure of 
$5,800.00 by defendant and counterclaimant 
was done pursuant to a contractual provision 
contained at "attachment A (f)fl and that 
such improvement was bargained for by plaintiff, 
and accounts for the increased market value 
of the property in question. [Emphasis added] 
(R.28) 
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From the above and foregoing modified Findings 
of Fact, the Court concludes that the down 
payment of $6,000.00 and the increased 
market value of the property resulting 
principally from the permanent improvements 
made by the defendant may be retained by the 
plaintiff since to require a return [sic] 
these sums to the defendant would deny 
plaintiff the benefit of the bargain he 
made... [Emphasis added] (R.29) 
The lower court's use of "benefit of the bargain" has no 
relationship to damages resulting to a seller from a 
buyer's breach. Under the lower court's theory, any 
down payment and any improvements regardless of the dollar 
amount or percentage of the total due under the contract 
would be forfeited or allowed as an offset. Under the 
correct interpretation of the law-, the seller is to be 
compensated for any loss of the benefit of an advantageous 
bargain. 
Appellants resold the property and apparently at a 
price and on terms better than the instant contract for 
appellants have refused to divulge the same to the court 
or respondent. Since there was no loss of bargain under 
the proper meaning of the offset, respondent is entitled 
to a return of the $6,000.00 down payment and $5,802.30 
for permanent improvements. 
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CONCLUSION 
In light of the above, this court is requested to 
sustain the lower court's decision that to enforce the for-
feiture provisions of the contract would be unconscionable 
in the instant case. Respondent further requests this court 
to find that the lower court erred in its finding that 
the $6,000.00 down-payment and the $5,802.30 in improvements 
should be kept by the plaintiff as a benefit of the bargain. 
Respondent requests that this court award a judgment to 
defendant in the sum of at least $16,465.85. 
Furthermore, respondent requests that he be awarded 
his costs incurred herein. 
Respectfully submitted} 
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